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CONCLUSION
The fundamental issue before the court in Child was simply
whether dedication of a substantial amount of tax-exempt money to
care for a cemetery was sufficiently beneficial to the public to warrant
the governmental revenue loss which would result. The Child court, by
requiring cemeteries to show that they relieve the burdens of poverty
in order to be eligible for estate tax deductible bequests, has reached a
conclusion which is neither analytically sound nor adequately sup-
ported by law. By failing to recognize that relief of governmental
burdens constitutes the underlying rationale for granting tax benefits
to charitable organizations, the court imposed an arbitrary "relief of
poverty" requirement on cemetery associations. The preferred ap-
proach both under the case law and by analogy to the law of charita-
ble trusts would have been to balance the general public benefit, or
degree of relief of governmental burdens against the social disadvan-
tage occasioned by the revenue loss associated with allowing the de-
ductions.
JAMES C. KNOX
Federal Courts—Diversity jurisdiction—Vaughan v. Southern Rail-
way Co.'
Eldon Swain, a resident of Virginia, was killed in North Carolina
when struck by a train operated by Southern Railway, a Virginia cor-
poration. 2 The decedent's mother, Marie Swain, also a citizen of Vir-
ginia, qualified under the law of that state as administratrix of the
Swain estate for the purposes of bringing suit against Southern Rail-
way for wrongful death. 4
 It was determined that the most convenient
place for trial would be the state of North Carolina, where the acci-
dent occurred and where all potential witnesses resided. 5 The law of
that state, however, required the appointment of a North Carolina
resident as ancillary administrator in wrongful death actions. 8 The
' 542 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 642.
3
 VA, CODE § 64,1-116 (1973).
' 542 F.2d at 642. There were no assets in the Swain estate other than the
wrongful death action. Id.
5 Id.
Id at 642-43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8 (1966) provides: "The clerk shall not issue
letters of administration or letters testamentary to any person who, at the time of ap-
pearing to qualify ... (2) Is a nonresident of this State ...." (fur current version of
provision see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-4-2 (Supp. 1975) ). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966)
provides:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, such as would, if the injured party had lived, have enti-
tled him to an action for damages therefore, the person or corporation
that would have been so liable, . shall be liable to an action for damages,
to be brought by the executor, administrator, or collector of' the decedent;
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plaintiff, Charles Vaughan, a North Carolina attorney, was therefore
appointed resident ancillary administrator of the Swain estate for the
purpose of bringing the wrongful death action.'
The action was brought in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina under the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. 8
 The motion was directed to
the restrictive standards of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 which proscribes the
joinder of parties for the purpose of creating federal jurisdiction. 8
The district court, relying upon decisions of the Fourth Circuit which
found section 1359 to prohibit the manufacture of diversity jurisdic-
tion through the appointment of an administrator to prosecute a
wrongful death claim," held that Vaughan's appointment was made
for the purpose of invoking the power of the federal courts, and as
such, constituted an improper creation of federal jurisdiction." With
no diversity of citizenship existing between the beneficiary and the de-
fendant as required for federal jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)"
the district court dismissed the action.' 3
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the decision below and HELD: because the ben-
eficiary was the real party in interest to the wrongful death action, her
citizenship would be determinative of federal diversity jurisdiction."
Accordingly, since the beneficiary and the defendant were both citi-
zens of Virginia, there was no diversity of citizenship upon which to
and this notwithstanding the death .... (emphasis supplied)
(for current version of provision see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1975) ).
1 542 F.2d at 642-43.
,4 Id. at 643.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970). The statute provides: "A district court shall not have
jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." Id.
See text at notes 49-63 infra for a discussion of the legislative history of the statute and
of the judicial construction given to it.
10
 These decisions were: Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1974) (the
appointment of a citizen of Georgia to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of a citi-
zen of South Carolina in South Carolina was held to be for the sole purpose of creating
federal diversity jurisdiction and thus in violation of section 1359); Miller v. Perry, 456
F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972) (under a North Carolina statute requiring the appointment of a
resident administrator in wrongful death actions, the citizenship of the beneficiary was
held to be determinative of federal diversity jurisdiction); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d
1101 (4th Cir. 1969) (the appointment of a citizen of Georgia to bring a wrongful death
action on behalf of a citizen of South Carolina in South Carolina was held to be for the
sole purpose of creating federal diversity jurisdiction and thus in violation of section
1359).
" 542 F.2d at 643.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). The statute in part provides: "(a) The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - (1)
citizens of different states; ...." Id. See text at notes 21-27 infra for a discussion of the
historical basis of diversity jurisdiction.
13
 542 F.2d at 643.
14 id.
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justify the exercise of such jurisdiction and the controversy more pro-
perly belonged in the state courts of either Virginia or North
Carolina. 15
In arriving at this determination, the court of appeats based its
holding upon a trilogy of decisons which addressed the issue of the
improper creation of diversity jurisdiction through the appointment
of an administrator."' These decisions collectively yielded a standard
of review that examined both the substantive stake of the adminis-
trator and the purpose of his appointment in evaluating an alleged
improper creation of'federal jurisdiction." While recognizing that the
North Carolina action had been initiated in good faith, the court of
appeals nonetheless concluded that the apparent diversity of citizen-
ship was pretensive because the chosen administrator had no stake in
the outcome of the controversy."' As a result, the court of appeals
concluded that while Vaughan's appointment was not solely for the
purpose of creating diversity of citizenship, the subsequent attempt to
put it to that use by bringing the action in federal court would be re-
garded presumptively as the substantial equivalent."' With no genuine
diversity of citizenship existing between the beneficiary and the de-
fendant, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court lacked juris-
diction to entertain the action. 20
The basic issue presented to the Fourth Circuit in Vaughan v.
Southern Railway Co. was whether the citizenship of the resident ad-
ministrator or the citizenship of the beneficiary would control for
"Id. at 644.
'" Id. at 643. These decisions were Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.
1974) (see text at notes 111-128 infra), Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972) (see
text at notes 86-110 infra), and Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969) (see
text at notes 66.81 infra).
' 7 542 F.2d at 644.
ul
Id.
" Id. The dissent written by Circuit judge Butzner encompassed several of the
criticisms that this casenote will direct at the ruling of the Fourth Circuit. The dissent
framed the issue in the case as being whose citizenship—that of the Fiduciary or that of
the beneficiary—would be considered in determining diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 645.
The dissent then acknowledged that federal law had traditionally used the citizenship of
the administrator in determining diversity of citizenship. Id. Although the dissent
pointed to two exceptions to this rule, it found that neither exception applied here. Id.
The first exception, embodied in the proscription of 28 U.S.C. § 1359, was not applica-
ble as the valid and substantial reasons, supporting the appointment, satisfied the re-
quirements of section 1359. Id. at 646. The specific application of the statute by the
majority was criticized because it dispensed with the necessity of proving collusion or
impropriety in a violation. As such, the majority created a per se rule to deny jurisdic-
tion by using the citizenship of the beneficiary to determine diversity jurisdiction. Id.
The second exception, embodied in the doctrines of the supremacy clause, was not pre-
sent in the case because the state statute requiring the appointment of a resident ad-
ministrator did not offend the supremacy clause by defeating federal jurisdiction over
the controversy. Id.; see text at notes 90-94 infra. Since the dissent viewed neither ex-
ception as being applicable, the traditional rule for the determination of diversity of
citizenship arguably remained controlling. 542 F.2d at 645. Where these discussions and
arguments are incorporated into this casenote they will be cited to the dissenting opin-
ion by an appropriate footnote. 977
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purposes of creating federal diversity jurisdiction over the wrongful
death action. In resolving this issue, the court of appeals' task ap-
peared to be clear: the court sought to formulate a rule of decision
concerning the appointment of an administrator to create diversity
jurisdiction that would be consistent both with precedent and with the
policy of jurisdictional statutes. As a result of these efforts, however,
the Vaughan court so expanded and manipulated the controlling
statutory standard of section 1359 as to render it largely superfluous.
In order to place the Vaughan decision in its proper context, this
casenote will first consider the purpose of diversity jurisdiction and
the standards previously imposed under the pertinent jurisdictional
statutes. It will then consider and analyze the Fourth Circuit's trilogy
of diversity jurisdiction decisions preceding Vaughan. Next, the note
will analyze and criticize the approach taken by the Vaughan court. Fi-
nally, this casenote will examine the most viable solution to the juris-
dictional issue in controversy and will conclude that the reasoning and
result of the Fourth Circuit is both inadequate and erroneous as it
misapplies existing precedent and statutes.
1. BACKGROUND: DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTIONS
The federal courts are, of course, courts of limited jurisdiction, 2 '
constitutionally empowered to hear cases "between Citizens of dif-
ferent States."22
 Congress has defined this diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 1332(a), which provides:
(a) the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil action where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between—(1) citizens of different States; .... 23
As constitutionally and statutorily defined diversity jurisdiction is
grounded in notions of federalism, its basic purpose being to provide
out-of-state litigants with a forum free from local prejudices. 24 In
order to guard against unjustified federal infringements upon state
judicial authority, however, the federal courts have created a pre-
sumption in diversity cases that the action is beyond the jurisdiction of
2 ' Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Gilchrist v. Strong,
299 F. Supp. 804, 807 (W.I./ Okla. 1969); see 6 C.A. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1557 at 717 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
22 U.S. CONST. art., III, § 2.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
" Lumberman's Mm. Gas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). As Justice Frankfurter explained,
The stuff of diversity jurisdiction is state litigation. The availability
of federal tribunals for controversies concerning matters which in them-
selves are outside federal power and exclusively within state authority, is
the essence of a jurisdiction solely resting on the fact that a plaintiff and a
defendant are citizens of different States. The power of Congress to con-
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the federal courts," and that statutes conferring such jurisdiction in
derogation of the power of state courts are to be strictly construed."
The principle underlying this presumption is that primarily local con-
troversies should be tried in the appropriate state forum whenever
prejudice to any party with a substantial interest in the litigation is not
threatened. 27
Rule 1 7(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
every action he prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. 28
Accordingly, in deciding whether diversity of citizenship exists, the
black-letter rule is that the citizenship of the real party in interest is
determinative." The definition of real party in interest under Rule 17
(a) is a question of federal procedure, and thus a matter of federal
law." However, under this federal definition, the focus of any inquiry
into the real party in interest must he on the party legally entitled to
prosecute the claim under the substantive law that the federal court
will apply in the case;"' "the party who, by the substantive law, pos-
sesses the right sought to be enforced, and not necessarily the person
who will ultimately benefit. from the recovery." 32 As diversity actions
litigate questions of state law," the relevant substantive law to be con-
sulted and applied in regards to the real party in interest must be
state law. 34 Therefore, while the party legally entitled under state law
to enforce the substantive right and the holder of the beneficial in-
fer such jurisdiction was based on the desire of the Framers to assure
out-of-state litigants courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.
Id. See also Gilchrist v. Strong, 299 F. Supp. 804, 807 (W.D. Okla. 1969); WRIGHT &
MILLER supra note 21, § 1556 at 711; but we Friendly, The Historic Basis y • Diversity Juris-
diction, 41 HARV. 1,. REV. 483, 487-99 (1928).
" Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1895); Fifty As-
sociates v. Prudential Ins, Co. of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970);
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F. 2d 867, 876 (3d Cir. 1968).
" Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1941); Healy v. Ratta,
292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); Gilchrist v. Strong, 299 F. Supp. 804, 807 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
27 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1556 at 711.
ss Filn. R. Civ, P. 17(a). The Rule provides in pertinent part: "(a) Real Party in
Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator ... may sue in his own name without joining with him the party
for whose benefit the action is brought; ...." /d.
23
 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1556 at 710.
" Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965).
" Peter v. Lines, 275 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1960); Armour Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Home Ins. Co., 60 F.R.D. 592, 594 (N.D. III. 1973); Race v. Hay, 28 F.R.D. 354, 355
(N.D. Ind. 1961); 3A MOORE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE 1 17.02 at 53 (2d ed. 1974); C.A.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 70 at 293 (2d ed. 1970). See ,Jett
v. Zink, 362 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1966); Hertz v. Record Publishing Co. of Erie, 219
F.2d 397, 399, 400 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S, 912 (1955); 3A MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 17.07 at 221-25 (2d ed. 1974); Comment, 47 N.Y.U,L. REV. 801, 805.06
(1972).
32 C.A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 70 at 293 (2d ed.
1970).
33
 Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954). See text at notes
21-27 supra.
34 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 94 (1938).
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terest in the action are often the same, it is the former that charac-
terizes the real party in interest for purposes of prosecuting any claim
in the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. As an example of
this possible dichotomy of interests, in North Carolina the beneficiary
of a wrongful death action obviously holds the beneficial interest, but
the substantive legal right to be enforced is given by statute to the
administra tor.35
Reflecting these basic principles, Rule 17(a) specifies that ad-
ministrators are parties who may sue in their own names without join-
ing with them the party for whose benefit the action is brought. 36 Ac-
cordingly, the traditional black-letter rule in actions involving an ap-
pointed administrator is that the citizenship of the administrator is de-
terminative for purposes of diversity jurisdiction."
Addressing the particular relevancy of this rule to actions for
wrongful death the Supreme Court, in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling
Co.," held that under a statute granting a right to recover for wrong-
ful death, the administrator was the real party in interest. As such, the
citizenship of the administrator, rather than that of the ben-
eficiary,was determinative of federal diversity jurisdiction." In Mecom,
the Court framed its holding in language descriptive of the adminis-
trator's duties under the facts and the requirements of state law,"
thereby suggesting the existence of some minimal requirement of in-
terest in the suit for the application of the decision's black-letter rule.
However, in Mecom the administrator had an extremely tenuous and
essentially artificial role in the action," and thus could not be consid-
ered anything more than a straw party designed to defeat diversity
jurisdiction.'" Even so, the Court found that the motive behind the
appointment" was immaterial, 44 and based its holding upon a re-
luctance to attack collaterally the lawful decree of the state probate
court which appointed the administrator.'"
35 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966) (for current version of provision see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1975) ). For text of § 28-173 see note 6 supra. See Homey
v. Meredith Swimming Pool Co., 267 N.C. 521, 523, 148 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1966).
36 FED. R. Cm P. 17(a). See note 28 supra.
37 Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (1823); see Chappedelaine v.
Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808).
38 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
35 1d. at 186.
'" Id. These duties under state law induded the responsibility for the conduct of
the suit, responsibility for distribution of its proceeds under the statute, and liability
upon his official bond for failure in his fiduciary duty. Id.
" Id, at 188. In Mecom, the administrator did not know the decedent or the be-
neficiary, consented to the appointment as a favor to the beneficiaries' attorney, did not
sign his own bond, never appeared in Oklahoma, and immediately named the be-
neficiary as his agent in Oklahoma. Id.
42 Id.
43
 That motive involved the appointment of an administrator from the de-
fendant's state to prevent removal to the federal district court. Id.
"Id. at 189.
45 Id.
980
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Essentially, Mecom stated the accepted rule upon which diversity
of citizenship was to be determined in wrongful death actions."
Nevertheless, the Mecom rule permitted the appointment. of rep-
resentatives who were chosen deliberately to defeat or to create di-
versity jurisdiction. 47 Therefore, to the extent that it permitted access
to the federal courts through the mere pretense of diversity of citizen-
ship, the Mecom rule ran counter to the general policy of viewing the
federal courts as tribunals of limited jurisdiction whose subject matter
principles should be applied with restraint." Thus, in light of the con-
stitutional and congressional policy of limiting the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary, the Mecom rule could not be allowed to stand as the
unqualified standard for diversity jurisdiction.
Congress addressed itself to the problem of the deliberate crea-
tion of diversity jurisdiction in section 1359 of Title 28 of the United
States Code. That section provides: "A district court shall not have
jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or
otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to in-
voke the jurisdiction of such court." 41 The Reviser's Note described
the new statute's purpose to be the prevention of "the manufacture of
Federal juriscliction." 50 Initially, however, the federal courts failed to
give a strict construction to section 1359 in accordance with this stated
purpose. For example, following the passage of section 1359, the pre-
vailing view among lower federal courts was that the appointment of a
fiduciary, even if done expressly to create diversity jurisdiction, did
not fall within the scope of the statute.'" The reasoning under this
view held that the citizenship of the administrator controlled the de-
termination of diversity jurisdiction as "there was no impropriety or
irregularity involved in the perfectly valid proceeding in the state
" See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1556 at 711-12.
47 See id. § 1556 at 712-13.
" See id. § 1557 at 717. See text at notes 25-26 supra.
4"
	 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970). Section 1359 has existed in its present form since the
1948 Revision of the judicial Code. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 825
(1969). Prior to this revision the creation of diversity jurisdiction was governed by two
statutes. The revision repealed § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. I Stat.79 (1789). That
provision had read: "No district court shall have cognizance of any suit to recover
upon any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, ... unless
such suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been
made." The revision then amended ch. 137, § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1875. 18 Stat.
470 (1875). That provision had read:
[The district court will dismiss] at any time ... [when] such suit does not
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have
been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or de-
fendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable ....
This repeal and amendment produced the present section 1359. Kramer, 394 U.S. at
825-26.
" Kramer,394 U.S. at 826.
" Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 786-87 (3d Cir. 1959) (overruled by
McSparran v, Weist, 402 F.2(1 867 (3d Cir. 1968); see WRIGHT & Mn.i.Ettsupra note 21, §
1557 at 717.
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court for the appointment of the out-of-state fiduciary." 52 This "valid-
ity under state law" standard permitted no inquiry into the motive be-
hind the appointment,53 and the terms "collusive" and "improper" were
held to apply only to illegal agreements or understandings between the
opposing parties.54
This permissive standard under section 1359 was subsequently
rejected by the Supreme Court in Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 55 a
case involving the assignment of a foreign corporation's contract claim
to an American attorney for the admitted purpose of making federal
diversity jurisdiction available." The Court framed the issue in the
language of section I 359's prohibition, 57 emphasizing its purpose to
prevent the manufacture of federal jurisdiction." Recognizing and
focusing upon the obvious purpose of the contrived, but legal transac-
tion, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority of the Court, gutted the
"validity under state law" argument and stated: "the existence of fed-
eral jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law.. .. this very case
demonstrates the ease with which a party may 'manufacture' federal
jurisdiction by an assignment which meets the requirements of state
law."5 " Consequently, the Court held that the assignment to create di-
versity jurisdiction was "improperly or collusively made" within the
meaning of section 1359." Simply, the agreement at issue in Kramer,
whereby the assignee merely provided his name for use in the title of
the action and agreed to return ninety-five per cent of any recovery to
the assignor," did not in substance-make the assignee the real party
in interest of the contract claim. Therefore, any apparent diversity
jurisdiction based upon his citizenship was artificial and created in vio-
lation of section 1359.
Thus, Kramer, in effect, enunciated a new, stricter standard for
the application of section 1359, one conforming both with the federal
judiciary's role as courts of limited jurisdiction and with the purpose
of section 1359 to prevent the "manufacture of Federal jurisdiction."'"
However, the Court specifically reserved the question of "whether, in
" McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 872 (3d Cir. 1968). This case overruled
Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959), the representative decision on
the initial construction given to section 1359. McSparran, 402 F.2d at 876.
"Mecam, 284 U.S. at 189; Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928).
• Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1959)(overruled by
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968) ): WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 21, {
1557 at 719; see Jansen v. Coos, 302 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1962).
"394 U.S. 823 (1969).
"Id. at 824, 828.
57 Id, at 825. The Court stated that the issue was: "(Wlhether Kramer was 'im-
properly or collusively made' a party 'to invoke the jurisdiction' of the District Court,
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1359." Id.
"Id. at 825.26; see note 49 and text at note 50 supra.
" 394 U.S. at 829.
• at 827.	 \
81 1d. at 828.
"See id at 828-29.
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cases in which suit is required to be brought by an administrator, a
motive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the appointment of an
out-of-state representative 'improper' or 'collusive'." 63
The decision in Kramer, in conjunction with the decision in
Mecom, formed the legal context for the Fourth Circuit's trilogy and
established the conceptual battleground upon which the Fourth Cir-
cuit struggled in Vaughan v. Southern Railway Co. This context consists
of two separate issues, one addressing the standard for determining
whether diversity of citizenship exists among the parties under section
1332 (a) (the Mecom rule) and the other addressing the standard for
determining whether there was collusion or impropriety in the crea-
tion of that diversity jurisdiction under section 1359 (the Kramer stan-
dard). A conceptual conflict appeared whereby the Mecom rule on its
face permitted the precise "collusion/impropriety" in the creation of
federal jurisdiction that the Kramer standard was specifically designed
to prohibit. The specific jurisdictional directive of section 1359 was
designed to limit and to control abuses in the invocation of the gen-
eral jurisdictional grant of section 1332(a); to prohibit the manufac-
ture of federal diversity jurisdiction." Consequently, it was the Fourth
Circuit's implicit goal in Vaughan to reconcile the potential conflict be-
tween the Mecom rule and the Kramer standard." In so doing, its pre-
cise need was to construct a mode of decision that would determine,
in a manner consistent with the policy and standard of section 1359,
the existence of diversity of citizenship where an administrator is ap-
pointed to bring a wrongful death action.
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT TRILOGY
A. Lester v. McFaddon
The Fourth Circuit first broached the conceptual conflict be-
tween the section 1359 standard and the Mecom rule in Lester v.
McFaddon." In Lester, lawyers representing a South Carolinian de-
cedent's estate secured the appointment of a Georgia lawyer as an
administrator both for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death ac-
tion under South Carolina law against a South Carolina citizen and
for the purpose of placing that action within the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts. 67
In confronting the issue of the standard to be applied under sec-
tion 1359 to determine the propriety of diversity jurisdiction, the Les-
ter court enunciated its desire not to "give the statute a reading which
would frustrate the congressional intention to exclude from the di-
versity jurisdiction purely local controversies with no more than a con-
63 1d. at 828 n.9,
" See note 49 and text at notes 50-62 supra.
" See 542 F.2d at 642, 644.
" 415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1103.
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trived interstate appearance."'" Accordingly, the Lester court held that
the appointment for the purposes of creating apparent diversity of
citizenship was an improper manufacture of jurisdiction within the
meaning of section 1359. 61
To resolve the issue of the artificial creation of diversity jurisdic-
don in suits brought by persona! representatives and to effectuate the
congressional purpose of Section 1359, the Lester court explicitly
adopted the reasoning advanced by the Third Circuit in McSparran v.
Weist," which accurately anticipated the Supreme Court's subsequent
Kramer decision.'" According to the McSparran court, the standard of
review under section 1359 involved the determination of whether the
representative was a "nominal party." 72 That court reasoned that if
the representative had no stake in the litigation and was appointed
solely for the purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction, he was not the
real party in interest.'" Relying on McSparran, the Lester court un-
dertook a review both of the substantive role of the administrator in
the litigation and of the motive for his appointment. 74 As to the sub-
stantive role of the administrator, the court determined that there was
"no distinction between this situation and that of the assignee which
"Id. at 1104. See note 49 and text at note 50 supra. The court further an-
nounced its belief that the South Carolina probate decree was not under collateral at-
tack in the federal court as the pertinent issue in the case was a federal question of
jurisdiction, which would not affect the bringing of any suit in a proper state court. 415
F.2d at 1105.
"Id. at 1104.
7° 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). McSparran involved the appointment of a non-
resident guardian for the conceded purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction in a per-
sonal injury suit and held that the appointment offended the directive of section 1359.
Id. at 868-76.
" 415 F.2d at 1104. McSparran was decided immediately prior to and in anticipa-
tion of the Supreme Court decision in Kramer. Id. at 874 n.20.
'402 F,2d at 870-71.
"Id. at 874-75. The court reasoned, "Whether in an individual case diversity
jurisdiction is 'manufactured' is, of course, a question of fact. Here 'manufactured' di-
versity is conceded, but in other cases where it is not conceded it will be for the district
court to make the factual determination." Id. at 876. See generally Groh v. Brooks, 421
F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir. 1970); Ferrara v. Philadelphia Laboratories, Inc., 272 F. Supp.
1000, 1007 (D. Vt. 1967). In Groh, the Court delineated a set of factors for determining
whether or not diversity of citizenship had been artificially created by the appointment
of a personal representative:
(title district court may consider, inter alia, such factors as the identity of
the representative and his relationship to the party represented; the scope
of the representative's powers and duties; any special capacity or experi-
ence which the representative may possess with respect to the purpose of
his appointment; whether there exists a non-diverse party, such as a par-
ent in a suit for injuries to a child, who might more normally be expected
to represent the interests involved; whether those seeking the appointment
of the representative express any particular reasons for selecting an out-
of-state person; and whether, apart from the appointment of an out-of-
state representative, the suit is one wholly local in nature.
421 F.2d at 595.
" 415 F.2d at 1104-05.
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the Supreme Court considered [in Kramer]	 ." 75 Accordingly, the
administrator in Lester was found to have no greater authority or
duties than the assignee in Kramerm and as such, was judged to have
no stake in the litigation." Consequently, the administrator was
termed a "nominal party" and the diversity jurisdiction based upon his
citizenship was found to be "... pretensive • [ and] improper within
the meaning of section 1359.'78
The Lester court then looked to the motive of the appointment,
justifying its inquiry on the basis and purpose of section 1359. 7 ° Sim-
ply, the court described the circumstances of the instant appointment
and concluded that it was "an act as voluntary and deliberate as is that
of an assignor in the Kramer situation."8 ° Additionally, the court stated
in a footnote that li]t is the lack of a stake in the outcome coupled
with the motive to bring into a federal court a local action normally tri-
able only in a state court which is the common thread of the cases
holding actions collusively or improperly brought.. . •
Thus, it appears that, following Lester, the conceptual basis upon
which diversity jurisdiction would be decided was clear: since the
Mecom rule had never been repudiated by the Supreme Court," was
based upon years of American judicial tradition,sa and was bolstered
by the procedural dictate of Rule 17(a)," this rule was substantially
entrenched as the black-letter law for determining the existence of di-
versity of citizenship. Kramer, and more directly Lester, added another
dimension to the analysis, however, by requiring that the strict stan-
dard of section 1359 be applied to determine whether or not the ad-
ministrator was a "nominal party." In applying that standard, the
court assessed the totality of the circumstances of the appointment
73 Id. at 1105.
"Id. at 1103-05. Though, under state law an administrator was required to
maintain the action, any recovery did not become part of the probate assets of the
estate. As the estate contained no assets other than the action, administrative duties
were limited to recovery. Also the administrator was procured by the lawyers handling
the litigation and was hardly expected to exercise any effective supervision of their con-
duct of the litigation. Id.
r Id. at 1103.
'" Id. at 1106.
"Id. at 1104-'05. See text at notes 42-45, 49-54 supra. Indeed, it is difficult to see
how motive could be entirely ignored in ascertaining the purpose for which the re-
presentative was selected in view of the language of section 1359. The very wording of
section 1359 indicates that the "improper" or " collusive" snaking or joining of a party is
fatal to the jurisdiction of the district court only if done to "invoke the jurisdiction of
such court"—i.e. to create diversity of citizenship; the terms "collusive" and "improper"
necessarily connote some purpose or motive to collude or to commit an impropriety.
" 415 F.2d at 1105 (emphasis supplied). The court may have referred to the mo-
tive element so obliquely because the substantive role of the administrator was so highly
transparent under the facts that it excluded any arguably "proper" motive for the ap-
pointment other than the invocation of federal jurisdiction.
8I Id. at 1106 n.I I (emphasis supplied).
" 542 F.2d at 645 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
" See text at note 37 supra.
81 See text at note 36 supra.
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through a two-pronged evaluation . The court first examined the sub-
stantive role of the administrator to see if he was merely a procedural
real party in interest with no genuine "stake" in the litigation. Addi-
tionally, the court examined the motivation of the appointment to see
if it was made "solely for the purpose" of creating diversity jurisdic-
tion.
A deceptively simple process of decision was thus delineated by
the case law: when an administrator was appointed to bring a wrong-
ful death action in the federal court claiming diversity jurisdiction, the
court would first apply the standard of LesterlMcSparran. If under that
standard the circumstances of the appointment were found to create
artificial and pretensive diversity, the court would look to the citizen-
ship of the beneficiary and dismiss if substantive diversity was lack-
ing. 85 However, if under that standard the appointment passed re-
view, then the court would apply the traditional Mecum rule, using the
citizenship of the administrator to determine the existence of diversity
of citizenship for federal jurisdictional purposes. In essence, a section
1332 (a) rule for the determination of diversity of citizenship would
be applied only in accordance with the finding under section 1359.
B. Miller v. Perry
The Fourth Circuit severely complicated this process in its deci-
sion of Miller v. Perry." In Miller, the fattfer of a Florida youth killed
in North Carolina, acting as the administrator of his son's estate,
brought suit in the federal district court under the North Carolina
Wrongful Death Act." The action was dismissed as the father, a res-
ident of Florida, could not qualify as the resident administrator re-
quired under North Carolina law. 88 The decedent's grandfather, a
citizen of North Carolina, was then appointed resident ancillary ad-
ministrator, and a second action was brought in the federal district
court. This second action was then dismissed for want of diversity be-
tween the resident administrator and the North Carolina defendant."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that under the particular facts of
the case the citizenship of the beneficiaries would control for the pur-
poses of federal diversity jurisdiction."
85 3A MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE, 1 17.04 at 112-14 (2d ed. 1974).
86 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972). For a more extensive discussion of this case see
Fourth Circuit Review, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 247, 283 (1975).
87 456 F.2d at 63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173, quoted at note 6 supra (for cur-
rent version of provision see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18.2 (Supp. 1975) ).
88 456 F.2d at 64.
!" Id. On the basis of these facts, it was clear that the issue presented to the Miller
court dealt solely with the question of the existence of diversity of citizenship under
constitutional and statutory grants; no question under section 1359 was presented since
North Carolina's resident administrator requirement worked in this case to defeat di-
versity of citizenship, rather than to create it improperly or collusively. See id. at 64.
"Id. at 67.
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The Miller court was confronted with a situation where out-of-
state plaintiffs were, in effect, denied a federal forum by state law.
This result obtained because the North Carolina requirement of a res-
ident administrator transformed the potential diversity action into an
action between a resident administrator and a resident defendant of
non-diverse citizenship." As such, the statute defeated federal di-
versity jurisdiction over any wrongful death action where the estate of
a non-resident decedent brought suit against a resident defendant.
Under these facts, the Fourth Circuit determined that if the
Mecom rule, holding the citizenship of the administrator to be de-
terminative of federal diversity jurisdiction, was constitutionally man-
dated, then its apparent conflict with the North Carolina statute
would render the state statute invalid under the supremacy clause."2
In essence, the North Carolina statute could be fully recognized and
survive a constitutional challenge only if the conflicting Mecom rule
was not a "constitutional imperative.""" Accordingly, in affirming the
district court, the Fourth Circuit found the Mecom rule to be neither
constitutionally nor inflexibly the criterion for the ultimate determina-
tion of diversity jurisdiction and, therefore, refused to apply the
Mecom rule to the facts of the case. 94
Seeking to justify this initial determination that the court was
neither constitutionally nor inflexibly bound by the Mecum rule, the
Fourth Circuit read Mecom as articulating not only a black-letter rule,
but also an implicit standard for application of that rule—namely,
"that the personal representative was clothed with such responsibilities
and authority that he, under federal standards was the real party in
interest."95 To bolster this reading, the court relied upon the series of
decisions extending from Kramer as authority for a substantive review
of the circumstances of the appointment. For example, the court
stated that, "[w]e are obliged to read Kramer as injecting a new note of
realism into the determination of diversity jurisdiction."" This read-
ing of Kramer, however, failed to recognize that Kramer's "new note"
and its power to examine the substance of the appointment pertained
only to the section 1359 "substantive role—motive for the appoint-
ment" standard for determining the improper creation of diversity
jurisdiction, and not to the determination of the existence of diversity
of citizenship which was involved in Mecom. It would appear, then,
that the Miller court clearly erred in failing to differentiate between
9 ' Id. at 64 -65.
"2 Id. at 64. See U.S. CoNsT art. VI. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the Un-
ited States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ...."
' 3 456 F.2d at 65.
" 4 See id. at 68.
"Id. at 65.
96 1d. at 67.
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these two separate, though closely related, issues."
While the Miller court's basic assessment of the Mecom rule as
being neither constitutionally nor inflexibly mandated is reasonably
defensible, it nonetheless represented an unnecessarily obscure course
of decision in the case. In Miller, the Fourth Circuit was presented
with at least three alternate courses of decision: affirming the district
court's denial of jurisdiction by strictly following Mecom; reversing the
district court by its selected abandonment of the Mecom rule; or re-
versing the district court by striking down the North Carolina statute
as unconstitutional." The first course was inadequate as it would have
failed to resolve the supremacy clause issue, and would have allowed a
state statutory requirement to deny federal jurisdiction in the case."
The second course would have preserved the North Carolina statute
and would have granted jurisdiction in the case, but would have
necessitated an abandonment of the Mecom rule.'" The third course,
however, would have resolved the supremacy clause issue and would
have equitably granted jurisdiction in the case without the complica-
tions of changing jurisdictional rules. As such, this third course ap-
pears to have been the simplest and most logical means of resolving
the controversy. 1 ° 1 While perhaps motivated by notions of federal ju-
dicial restraint and prudence,'° 2 the Miller court's efforts to preserve
the North Carolina statute by manipulating the meaning of the Mecom
rule and section 1359 served primarily to excuse the court from the
accepted dictates of the Mecom rule and to thereby justify the genesis
of a new jurisdictional standard.
Having thus cast the Mecom rule aside, the Miller court formu-
" While the decisions in Kramer, McSparran, and Lester did indeed suggest that
Mecom was not inflexible and was subject to section 1359 review, it was misleading and
obscuring to declare, as the Fourth Circuit did in Miller, that the analysis of section
1359 in those decisions vitiated the Mecom rule even where no section 1359 issue was
involved. See id.
9" See Fourth Circuit Review, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV, 247, 284-85 (1973).
" See text at notes 90-93 supra.
I" See text at notes 92-94 supra.
ig' See Fourth Circuit Review, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 247, 293-94. This article
states that only North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and West Virginia have such statut-
ory requirements in a wrongful death action, so a decision declaring the North Carolina
statute unconstitutional would have had only a very limited effect. Id. at 284-85 & n.20.
It appears that the most persuasive argument in declaring the statute unconstitutional
would have been based on supremacy clause grounds. The Supreme Court has rejected
direct and indirect interference with federal jurisdiction by state law. Mexican Cent. Ry.
v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194, 206-07 (1893); Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 270, 286 (1871). There is also a possible equal protection challenge which asserts
that the requirement of a resident administrator bears no rational relation to the state's
putative interest. See Comment, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 801, 810 (1972); Miller, 456 F.2d at 65
n.5. In fact, North Carolina has recently reformed its laws for the administration of de-
cedent's estates. Section 28-8, the resident administrator requirement, was repealed and
a simpler requirement that non-resident administrators appoint a resident agent to facili-
tate the service of process was enacted in its place. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 28A-4-2(4) (Supp.
1975), The Wrongful Death Act itself was reenacted in substantially its previous form.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Supp. 1975).
102 See 456 F.2d at 65.
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lated its own rule for determining diversity jurisdiction by summarily
referring to North Carolina case law which considered the beneficiary
to be the real party in interest. 103 However, this use of North Carolina
law was not appropriate for several reasons. 1 °" First, the issue pre-
sented in Miller was one of federal procedure and jurisdiction and
thus an exclusive matter of federal law. 105 As such, the forum state
definition of the real party in interest as the possessor of the benefi-
cial interest in an action was not applicable because it governed only
that party's rights in state court.'" If the court had desired to un-
dertake a true "real party in interest" analysis in order to formulate a
substitute for what it reasoned to be an inapplicable Mecom rule, it
should have first looked at the federal law for a definition of the
term. Under federal law the real party in interest is defined as the
party, who under the substantive law, possesses the substantive legal
right sought to be enforced, rather than the party with the beneficial
interest in the action.'" Under this federal analysis, the proper in=
quirt'' in Miller would have focused upon the substantive law, which in
diversity cases is state law, to determine the party with the substantive
legal right to be enforced.'" Under the North Carolina wrongful
death statute this right was given to the administrator.'" Thus, in
having selected to excuse itself from the dictates of Mecom and to
abandon the accepted federal jurisdictional standard, the Miller court
clearly erred in its reference to North Carolina case law as being ma-
terial to the determination of diversity jurisdiction because that state
law bore no reference to or foundation in the federal concepts of real
party in interest that are traditionally determinative of federal di-
versity jurisdiction. Still, the Fourth Circuit chose to advance a new,
poorly defined rule for diversity jurisdiction; one that was contrary on
its face to the Mecum rule in that the citizenship of the beneficiary
would be determinative of the existence of diversity of citizenship." 0
C. Bishop v. Hendricks
The effects of Miller first appeared in Bishop v. Hendricks. 111
Bishop presented a fact situation similar to that in Lester. Decedent,
beneficiaries, and defendant were all citizens of South Carolina. A
'" Id. The court cited Broacifnot v. Everett, 270 N.C. 429, 154 S.E.2d 522 (1967),
a complex case whose issue centered on a statute of limitations and conflict of laws pro-
blem, not the real party in interest concept. Id. at 431-32, 154 S.E.2d at 526-27.
104 Fourth Circuit Review, 30 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 247, 291 (1973).
1 " See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965).
1 " Waw-Fr & MILLER supra note 21, § 1544 at 647-48.
1"4
	 C.A. WRICDIT, H ANDBOOK OF THE LAW (w FEDERAL COURTS, § 70 at 293. See
text at notes 28-35 supra.
"'See text at notes 31-34 supra.
lo" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966) (for current version of provision see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (Stipp. 1975) ). For text of § 28-173 sec note 6 .supra.
" 0 456 F.2d at 68.
"' 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1974).
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citizen of Georgia, who was related to the beneficiaries by marriage,
was appointed administrator to bring a wrongful death action under
South Carolina law in the federal court." 2 The district court, applying
the Miller rule, dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction." 3 The
Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed, finding the administrator to be
"a 'straw party' appointed ... solely for the purposes of providing a
nominal plaintiff for the maintenance of this action"" 4 and holding
his appointment to be "manifestly an artificial creation of federal di-
versity and as such cannot support jurisdiction."" 5
The facts in Bishop presented a situation ideally suited for the
conceptual process suggested by Kramer and Lester under section
1359. 116 The decision, however, was couched in terms of the Miller
decision. As such, the court appeared intent upon confusing the ques-
tion of review under section 1359 with the separate question of whose
citizenship would be determinative of diversity jurisdiction. Indeed,
the court, explicitly rejecting the argument that the scope of Millerk
should be confined to its peculiar facts," 7
 framed the case as involv-
ing a single issue—"the choice between the old purely mechanical or
`ritualistic' rule [Mecum] . . . and ... the more recent 'substantive real
party in interest test' Willed."'" Through this confusion of issues,
Bishop represented an attempt to reach a result under an application
of the Miller rule that would reflect the policy and standards of sec-
tion 1359.
In this attempt, the Bishop court implicitly subsumed the separate
section 1359 "motive" and "stake" standard into the Miller rule."" In
Bishop, motive was a significant point of contention because the district
court had specifically, but without explanation, judged the motives in
the appointment to have been proper.' 2° The Fourth Circuit, how-
ever, was not persuaded, and engaged in a more extensive review of
motive than had been undertaken in previous decisions where the mo-
tive of the appointment was obviously or concedely for the purpose of
creating diversity jurisdiction.' 21
In this review, the court clearly 'defined the requisite motive
element as being a "purpose" to create federal jurisdiction.' 22 How-
ever, the court first assumed that the administrator was appointed
solely for the purpose of creating federal diversity jurisdiction unless
valid and substantial reasons supporting the appointment appeared in
I" Id. at 290.
" 3 1d. at 291.
Id. at 296.
"5 1d.
'"See text at notes 81-85 supra.
' 1 '495 F.2d at 291.
" 8 Id.
" 3 See id. at 291-95.
"G Id. at 297. The reasons for the appointment were the administrator's kinship
by marriage and his purported superior business judgment. Id.
III See id.
"5 Id. at 293.
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the record.'" The court then evaluated the reasons for the appoint-
ment to determine whether those reasons realistically established that
the administrator sustained more than a nominal relationship to the
litigation.'" Consequently, the court eliminated sentiment and kin-
ship,' 25 or superior business judgment'" as viable motives under sec-
tion 1359. Finally, the court engaged in a substantive review of the
administrator's role in the litigation. It examined the administrator's
duties' 27 and found that he had "failed to establish any substantive
facts ... that would give 'substance' to his representation or fix his
status in the suit as different from nominal. Without any 'real [or)
substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation' he possesses no
stake in the litigation. ' "128
The Bishop court's pronouncements were a precise application of
the section 1359 standard as developed through Kramer and Lester.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the motive of the appoint-
ment was judged to be "solely for the purpose" of creating federal
jurisdiction 129 and the administrator was judged to have no stake" in
the litigation."° However, the court purported to apply a construction
of section 1359 "adopted and applied in Miller.""' As stated earlier, 132
Miller addressed itself only to the issue of whose citizenship was to be
determinative of diversity and did not consider section 1359. It would
seem, then, that the court clearly believed that its application of the
section 1359 standard was directed not to the issue of the improper
creation of diversity jurisdiction, but rather to the ultimate determina-
tion of the diversity issue itself. 133 Thus, the section 1359 issue was
subsumed into the section 1332(a) determination.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Bishop thereby embodied a point
of confusion in the development of jurisdictional standards. The court
announced a decision under the Miller rule, but in fact it decided the
jurisdictional question along the conceptual lines of section 1359 stan-
dards. This confusion was unnecessary to the specific result in the
case because the administrator would have been disqualified under
any independent application of the section 1359 standard. Neverthe-
less, this confused blending of standards became significant when the
section 1359 standard of Lester would not have been sufficient in itself
143
"4 /d. at 294.
125 1d, at 293.
"'Id. at 296.
'"Id. at 295-96. The only relationship the administrator had to the action was
the use of his name. No assets, other than the action, existed in the estate. The adminis-
trator made no contribution to the actual prosecution of the action, nor did he take any
actual part in the employment of counsel, Id.
"" Id. at 295.
"A Id. at 296.
' 3 " /d, at 295.
"' Id. at 294.
132
 See text at notes 86-110 supra.
133 495 F.2d at 294-95.
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to dispose of a jurisdictional question over an appointment. This situa-
tion was precisely the one presented in Vaughan v. Southern Railway Co.
III. THE VAUGHAN APPROACH
It was upon this trilogy of decisions that the Fourth Circuit con-
fronted the controversy in Vaughan v. Southern Railway Co. 134 In light
of these cases, the court easily rejected the argument that Mecom was
dispositive of the decision. 133 While presenting a new "twist" in its
facts,' 36
 Vaughan presented a situation conceptually similar to that of
Lester and Bishop. As such, the court was once again called upon to
evaluate the effect of the appointment of an administrator of a
wrongful death action upon the creation of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.
Under the Fourth Circuit's trilogy two alternate modes of deci-
sion appeared to be available to the court of appeals: the Lester ap-
proach or the Bishop-Miller approach. In the former approach, the
section 1359 standard of review formed the primary issue in the
jurisdictional controversy. Accordingly, a rule for the determination of
diversity of citizenship was applied pursuant to the section 1359 find-
ing.'" In the latter approach, the rule for the determination of di-
versity of citizenship formed the single issue in the jurisdictional con-
troversy, and the section 1359 standard for determining the improper
creation of jurisdiction was subsumed into the application of the rule
as a means of eliminating the appointed administrator from the con-
sideration of diversity jurisdiction.'" Under either approach, the sec-
tion 1359 standard of review consisted of the dual elements of "stake"
and "motive," which served to define the improper "nominal party."
While the court in Vaughan correctly identified the dual elements of
the section 1359 standard; 136
 its treatment of that standard signalled a
significant deviation from the approaches of either Lester or Bishop-
Miller.
The Vaughan court limited itself initially to a purely cursory
disposition of the "stake" element. The court of appeals simply con-
cluded: "Vaughan has no stake in the outcome of the controversy.' ,140
However, this conclusion failed to consider the factual circumstances
of the case. Arguably, a significant "stake" may have been made out in
favor of Vaughan under North Carolina law.' 4 t For example, a prop-
erly appointed administrator must exist for the wrongful death action
134 542 F.2d at 642.
133 Id. at 644.
133 Unlike Lester and Bishop the situs of the fatal accident was not in the state of
residence of the decedent and the defendant. Id. at 642.
137
 See text at notes 81-85 supra.
1 " See text at notes 119-34 supra.
135
 542 F.2d at 644.
145 Id.
1 " See text at notes 31-35, 68-81 supra.
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to be prosecuted,' 42 and he is considered the plaintiff in the action.' 45
Furthermore, the administrator acts as trustee over the proceeds of
the action and thereby holds legal title over them.'" As such, the ad-
ministrator must be regarded as having authority; he is not a mere
figurehead.'" The court of appeals failed to account for any of these
characterizations of the substantive role of the administrator under
North Carolina law.
Whereas both the Lester and Bishop-Miller approaches entailed a
careful review of the administrator's substantive relationship to the
controversy, the court in Vaughan was satisfied to rely solely upon its
single conclusory statement.'" This cursory disposition, in effect,
suggested an implicit presumption that the administrator had no
"stake", yet neither Lester nor Bishop-Miller was predicated on any such
presumption, whether implicit or explicit. Thus, where the court of
appeals should have undertaken a review of the administrator's sub-
stantive role in the controversy, accounting for the assessments of
North Carolina law, it chose, in effect, to presume that role to be in-
significant.
Directing itself to the issue of the "motive" element, the Vaughan
court first recited the section 1359 standard and the truism that viola-
tion of' that standard was not dependent upon an evil motive, but
rather upon a "purpose of creating apparent diversity of citizen-
ship.""' The court of appeals found that the circumstances made the
purity of the beneficiary's motive beyond question. 14 " Indeed, valid
strategic reasons supported the bringing of the action in North
Carolina, and North Carolina law required the appointment. 14 " Thus,
the "motive" element as developed in both the Lester and the Bishop-
Miller approaches was apparently satisfied as the appointment was
motivated by factors other than simply the creation of federal jurisdic-
tion.' 5°
However, the Vaughan court went further, and argued that while
the appointment itself was in no way motivated by a purpose to create
federal jurisdiction, the subsequent attempt to bring the action in fed-
eral court after the "innocent" creation of jurisdiction was the "sub-
142 Bowen V. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 415, 196 S.E.2d 789,
803 (1973),
14 ' See Homey v. Meredith Swimming Pool Co., 267 N.C. 521, 523, 148 S.E.2d
554, 556 (1966).
144 /n re Estate of Below, 12 N.C. App. 657, 657-59, 184 S.E.2d 378, 378-81
(1971).
'" First Union Nat'l Bank of North Carolina v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 22, 145
S.E.2d 352, 357 (1965).
Ha 542 F.2d at 644. It must be acknowledged, as was the situation in Bishop, that
there were no other assets in the estate besides the wrongful death action; thus only
limited duties would be required until an actual recovery. Id. at 642.
1 " 542 F.2d at 644.
' id.
Id.
'" Id.
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stantial equivalent" of an unexplained improper purpose.'" Whereas
the approaches of both Lester and Bishop-Miller described the only im-
propriety under section 1359 as an appointment for the purpose of
creating federal jurisdiction, the Vaughan court suggested the formula-
tion of a new concept. This new concept of impropriety pertained not
to the appointment that joined the administrator to the wrongful
death action, but rather pertained to the subsequent attempt, by a
party whom the court had presumptively judged to be a "stakeless"
administrator, to initiate the action in federal court. Where the court
should have been satisfied under the preceding trilogy decisions with
its evaluation of the motives for the appointment itself, it chose rather
expansively to equate the actual attempt to initiate the action in fed-
eral court, by an administrator who was clearly not appointed for the
purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction, to an improper purpose re-
lating to the original appointment.
From this evaluation of the administrator and his appointment,
the court of appeals insisted upon using the Miller rule to determine
diversity of citizenship — "we conclude here, as in Miller, that we
should look to the citizenship of the beneficiary in Virginia rather
than that of the North Carolina administrator ...." 152 However, in so
adopting the Miller rule, without a recognizable application of the ac-
cepted standard under section 1359, the court of appeals was in no
way entirely consistent with the two alternate approaches for the
analysis of the creation of diversity jurisdiction that were available
under the previous, conceptually similar decisions of Lester, Miller, and
Bishop. 153
 Consequently, under the Lester approach, no valid applica-
tion of section 1359 was undertaken by the court of appeals in ac-
cordance with which any rule for the determination of diversity of
citizenship could be applied; under the Bishop-Miller approach, no
valid application of section 1359, subsumed into the Miller rule for the
determination of diversity of citizenship, was undertaken by the court
of appeals as a means of eliminating the administrator from the con-
sideration of jurisdiction. Simply, the Vaughan court did not apply the
section 1359 standard, as defined in the trilogy decisions, that was
essential under the approaches of either Lester or Bishop-Miller for the
application of any rule for the determination of diversity of citizen-
ship.
By its distorted application of section •1359, the Fourth Circuit
looked directly to the citizenship of the beneficiary for the determina-
tion of the existence of diversity jurisdiction.' 54 In effect, the court of
appeals simply ignored the position of the administrator. As a result,
the Vaughan court took the Fourth Circuit one step further from the
original thrust of the Mecom and Kramer decisions. Like the Miller and
15 Id.
1S3 See text at notes 137-39 supra.
134 See 542 F.2d at 646 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
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Bishop courts, the Vaughan court saw the issue of the improper crea-
tion of federal diversity jurisdiction as involving one, not two, ques-
tions. However, unlike the preceding decisions interpreting section
1359, the Vaughan court failed adequately to consider the purpose of
the appointment and the role of the administrator in the particular
case.
By pursuing this one dimensional approach, while ignoring the
requisite section 1359 analysis, the Vaughan court has completed a
"circular" pattern of development. The decision law proceeded in def-
inite increments: the rigid diversity of citizenship rule in Mecom; the
injection and subsequent judicial disregard of section 1359; the excep-
tion placed upon the Mecom rule by the stricter section 1359 standard
of Kramer; the application of this stricter standard in Lester-McSparran;
the initial and obscured framing of a new diversity of citizenship rule
under the circumstances of Miller; the confusion of Bishop, blending
the Miller rule and the section 1359 standard; the analysis of Vaughan
which applied a simple rule, but which ignored the section 1359 stan-
dard. Vaughan, thus, represents the final stage of this developmental
cycle whereby a simple rule was adopted and applied—the citizenship
of the beneficiary would be determinative of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion.
This rule was spawned by the conceptual conflict between the in- '
flexible application of the Mecom rule and the dictates of section
1359.' 55 Yet, in seeking to reconcile this conceptual inconsistency, the
Vaughan court opted for a rule that was as bare and inflexible as that
in Mecom. The court of appeals' efforts refused any application of the'
statutory standards; section 1359 was utilized as neither an in-
dependent standard of review nor as a subsumed standard within the
application of the rule. No determination of collusion or impropriety
was made; little effort was made to determine the purpose of the ap-
pointment and the substantive position of the administrator. In the
context of an administrator appointed to bring a wrongful death ac-
tion, section 1359 was rendered superfluous and meaningless. The
court of appeals, in effect, accomplished the gutting of section 1359; a
bare, inflexible rule now controls.'"
Substantial criticism lies against the Vaughan-Miller rule itself.
The rule was initially framed in Miller to avoid a constitutional conflict
under the supremacy clause.'" No such constitutional issue was pre-
sented in Vaughan and thus the Miller court's reason for abandoning
the Mecom rule and for framing a substitute method of decision equit-
ably to resolve its particular jurisdictional controversy did not exist.' 58
Furthermore, as a conceptual matter, the particular facts of the
case even absent the required joining of the administrator in North
Carolina presented a situation similar to cases of genuine diversity of
'" See text at notes 63-65 supra.
I56 542 F.2d at 646 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
"'See text at notes 90-94, 98-101 supra.
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citizenship. Mrs. Swain and Southern Railway were of non-diverse citi-
zenship, but Swain brought suit in another state. Thus, the case pre-
sented two non-citizens pursuing an action in a separate foreign
forum state. Accordingly, the controversy was not one of purely local
dimensions and the litigants, like those in an action between citizens of
different states, faced the prospect of being drawn into a foreign
forum subject to local attitudes and prejudices. In addition, the de-
fendant was a railway corporation, and as such had substantial con-
tact, influence, and business within the forum state. Therefore,
Southern Railway was even something more than a mere "non-citizen"
with no connection to the forum state; it was, in fact, alleged at first to
have been a citizen of North Carolina.' 59
 Considering these facts, it is
at least arguable that the case contained the same necessity for the
federal protection of plaintiffs from the local prejudices of the forum
state that forms the theoretical basis of diversity jurisdiction in more
"traditional" fact situations.'"
The Vaughan-Miller rule also falls far short of achieving the
simplicity and consistency desired in any jurisdictional rule. While
problems may inhere in any process for the determination of diversity
jurisdiction by the citizenship of a personal representative,'" the
Vaughan -Miller rule created more problems than it solved. The federal
courts demand complete diversity among parties.'" Thus, under
Vaughan -Miller, a case with multiple beneficiaries would apparently be
denied a federal forum if one of the beneficiaries was a citizen of the
defendant's state. Regardless of the citizenship of the administrator,
the decedent, or the beneficiaries, complete diversity of citizenship
would be lacking as long as one of the beneficiaries and one of the
defendants were of non-diverse citizenship. 1 e"
Further questions arise as to the future application of the rule.'"
Would the rule apply to an executor appointed by the decedent?
Would the rule apply when the administrator had powers and duties
beyond those of Vaughan such that he would possess an undeniable
138
 542 F.2d at 646 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
136 542 F.2d at 645 n.4.
160 See text at notes 21-27 supra.
161
 WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 21,
	 1557 at 723.
1 °' Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
163
 The problems inherent in the rule were compounded, in its specific applica-
tion to the facts of Vaughan, by the court of appeals' refusal to apply the rule prospec-
tively. 542 F.2d at 644-45. Both Mc5parran and Lester applied their holdings prospec-
tively. 402 F.2d at 876-77; 415 F.2d at 1106-08. Those courts departed from the Black-
stonian view that judges only discover the law and that any previous inconsistent de-
claration was a nullity. 402 F.2d at 876-77; 415 F.2d at 1106. In Vaughan, the state stat-
ute of limitations barred the subsequent initiation of the dismissed action in the proper
state forum; if federal jurisdiction was not granted, the claim could never be brought to
trial. 542 F.2d at 645 n.4. Where the court so misdirected precedent and statute to give
legitimacy to its chosen rule, it would have been appropriate for the court to avoid in-
justice in the case, which was untarnished by collusion or impropriety, by applying its
decision prospectively. Id. at 647 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
"'See 542 F.2d at 647 n.5 (dissenting opinion). See note 20 supra.
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"stake" in the litigation? If so, how substantial would these powers and
duties have to be to define the requisite "stake"? Would creditors
pressing preferred claims against an estate be considered beneficiaries
within the meaning of the rule? How would jurisdiction be de-
termined when the decedent's estate was the beneficiary under the
wrongful death act? All these questions are posed by the Vaughan-
Miller rule and offer areas ripe for complex future litigation. In addi-
tion, no language in the opinion appeared to limit the rule to adminis-
trators of wrongful death actions. Therefore, the rule would in theory
appear to be applicable to all fiduciaries. As such, the confusion in
formulating and applying the rule to administrators in wrongful death
actions could . be compounded many times over in all actions brought
by fiduciaries who seek federal diversity jurisdiction.
The task of reconciling the conceptual conflicts between the
standards of section 1359 and the traditional rule for the determina-
tion of diversity jurisdiction need not lead to such anomalous results
as those dictated by the Fourth Circuit. For example, as the most via-
ble reform in this area the American Law Institute's Study of the Divi-
sion of Jurisdiction between Stale and Federal Courts proposed to attribute
the citizenship of the decedent to the administrator authorized to
bring a wrongful death action for the purpose of determining di-
versity of citizenship and federal jurisdiction. 165 The institute's pro-
posal would greatly simplify the determination of diversity jurisdiction
in wrongful death actions involving an appointed administrator; the
nature and purpose of the appointment would no longer bear upon
the jurisdictional issues. Therefore, application of the section 1359
standard, in any form, would not be ignored, but rather would be
functionally unnecessary. While the Institute's proposal would do
much to reform this jurisdictional area, the Vaughan-Miller substitute
did little to promote either the policies of diversity jurisdiction or the
efficient administration of justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having confronted the conceptual conflicts presented by the cre-
ation of federal diversity jurisdiction through the appointment of an
administrator in a wrongful death action, the Fourth Circuit in
'" American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Fed-
eral Courts § 1301 (b)(4) (Official Draft 1969); see generally, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts,
46 F.R.D. 141 (1969). The Study originated from a suggestion of Mr. Chief Justice War-
ren in a 1959 address to the Institute: "It is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdic-
tional balance between the federal and state court systems, assigning to each system
those cases most appropriate in the light of the basic principles of federalism." jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts, 46 F.R.D. at 141. The Study reflected an eight year effort to make
such a principled allocation of judicial business. Id. The Lester court acknowledged the
existence of the Institute's proposal, 415 F.2d at 1106, and the Miller court specifically
noted that its rule approached, without achieving, the purpose of the Institute's pro-
posal. 456 F.2d at 68.
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Vaughan v. Southern Railway Co. chose to adopt the new Miller rule
holding that the citizenship of the beneficiary would be controlling for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. In this process the Vaughan court so
distorted the section 1'359 standard of review as defined by the Fourth
Circuit's trilogy of diversity jurisdiction decisions that the application
of the "stake" and "motive" elements of the standard was rendered
largely unrecognizable. This application, in effect, served only to jus-
tify an essentially bare application of the Miller rule itself. Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit's application of the Miller rule was built upon a
questionable foundation. In addition, the rule itself, in light of its own
inherent weaknesses and in comparison to the preferred reform pro-
posal, possesses dubious future utility. Thus, in its barest elements the
Vaughan decision represents the Fourth Circuit's indulgence in the
final statges of a process of judicial rule-making. However, this pro-
cess and the search for an alternate rule of decision in the jurisdic-
tional controversy must be said to have ultimately foundered.
THOMAS A. MURPHY, JR.
Constitutional Law—Taxpayer's Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination—Fisher v. United States.' In the consoli-
dated case of Fisher v. United States, 2
 the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege prevents
enforcement of a documentary summons directed toward his attorney
for the production of his accountant's workpapers which had been
transferred to the attorney by the taxpayer. 3 Faced with an investiga-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) for possible civil and
criminal tax liability, the taxpayers in United States v. Fisher' and United
States v. Kasmir 5 obtained certain documents from their accountants
and transferred them to their attorneys!' Shortly after the transfer,
the I.R.S. served a summons on each of the attorneys to compel their
production of the transferred documents.' When the attorneys re-
' 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Two cases, Fisher v. United States, 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir.
1974), and United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), were consolidated be-
cause of the identity of issues and the conflict between the courts of appeals' decisions.
2 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
3 1d. at 394.
352 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 500 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1974), affd, sub
nom. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
5 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The district court opin-
ion is unpublished.
425 U.S. at 394. The documents transferred in Kasmir consisted of the accoun-
tant's workpapers, copies of correspondence between the accountant and the taxpayer,
and copies of the taxpayer's tax returns for three years. In Fisher, the taxpayers trans-
ferred their accountant's analyses of their income and expenses, based upon informa-
tion copied from the taxpayer's checks and deposit receipts. Id.
26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1970) provides authority to summon books and records in
the following language:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, mak-
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